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Abstract and Keywords
In Shakespeare’s comedies, sensation is both a problem and a solution. It is the source of 
division and the grounds of unity. This paradox is consistent with the early modern 
period’s mixed conception of the senses. If antitheatrical tracts and clerical literature 
denounced sensory experience as an impediment to truth and spiritual understanding, 
printed defences of theatre and a variety of medical and psychological tracts treated the 
senses as a powerful source of knowledge and judgement. This essay traces how 
Shakespeare’s treatment of the senses relates to both of these traditions. It addresses the 
connection between this double rendering of sensation and comic form and concludes by 
considering the ethical implications of sensory experience in the theatre. Examples are 
drawn from a variety of plays, including The Comedy of Errors, A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, The Merchant of Venice, and As You Like It.
Keywords: Shakespeare, comedy, senses, knowledge, performance, phenomenology, ethics
YOU don’t need to dig very deep to notice how prevalent the senses are in Shakespeare’s 
comedies. Even a quick search in a Shakespeare concordance for terms like ‘see’, ‘hear’, 
‘smell’, ‘taste’, ‘touch’, and ‘feel’ shows that they were woven tightly into the linguistic 
and thematic fabric of the plays. A more complicated task is to answer the basic questions 
this observation raises: how exactly did the senses function in Shakespeare’s comedies? 
How were they portrayed on stage and how did they generate meaning in the theatre? An 
instinctive reply might be that the senses are treated with profound scepticism, that stock 
comic devices such as disguise and mistaken identity portray the senses as unreliable 
guides to the world, rudimentary in their ability to gather accurate information and 
vulnerable to manipulation and deceit. Indeed, characters such as Rosalind in As You Like 
It, Portia in The Merchant of Venice, Viola in Twelfth Night, and Angelo in Measure for 
Measure have remarkably little difficulty fooling the eyes and ears of those with whom 
they interact. But this is only part of the picture. It is also true that many of the comedies, 
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including most of the ones I have just mentioned, achieve at least some degree of 
resolution through a process of revelation and recognition. They conclude with scenes of 
collective seeing and hearing in which identities are set straight and community is re-
established in a new commons of perception and knowledge.
In Shakespeare’s comedies, in other words, sensation is both a problem and a solution. It 
is the source of division and the grounds of unity. As paradoxical as this may sound, it is 
consistent with the early modern period’s mixed conception of sensation and the senses. 
If anti-theatrical tracts and clerical literature denounced sensory experience as an 
impediment to truth and spiritual understanding, printed defences of theatre and a 
variety of medical, religious, and psychological tracts treated the senses as a powerful 
source of knowledge and judgement. In what follows, I will be tracing how Shakespeare’s 
treatment of the senses relates to both of these traditions, addressing as well the 
connection between this double rendering of sensation and comic form. Most of my 
examples will be drawn from The Comedy of Errors, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and As 
You Like It. I will conclude the essay by considering the ethical implications of 
sensory experience in the theatre with particular reference to Merchant.
The Problem of Sensation
What does it sound like when the senses go wrong on stage? If we had to choose one 
passage to illustrate this, surely it would be the following:
I pray thee, gentle mortal, sing again.
Mine ear is much enamoured of thy note;
So is mine eye enthralled to thy shape;
And thy fair virtue’s force perforce doth move me
On the first view to say, to swear, I love thee.
(3.1.130–4)
This passage is from Dream; the lines are spoken by Titania. The iconic stage image of 
the Queen of Fairies falling in love with an ass-headed Bottom the Weaver emblematizes 
in particularly uproarious fashion the susceptibility of ‘ear’ and ‘eye’ to manipulation. The 
scene contributes to a larger theme of conflict between sense and reason in the play. The 
distinction is made early on when Hermia disobeys her father by choosing Lysander over 
Demetrius. ‘I would my father but looked with my eyes’, Hermia complains. Duke Theseus 
promptly retorts, ‘Rather your eyes must with his judgment look’ (1.1.56–7). Theseus 
makes a similar differentiation between sense and reason towards the end of the play 
when he considers the lovers’ account of their experience in the woods:
More strange than true. I never may believe
These antique fables, nor these fairy toys.
(p. 237) 
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Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
More than cool reason ever comprehends.
(5.1.2–6)
The tension in these lines is between apprehension and comprehension. The latter is 
clearly aligned with reason while the former has to do with a way of knowing that is 
linked to the body. To apprehend means ‘to grasp’ or ‘to seize’, and can also mean ‘to feel 
emotionally’ or ‘to see’.  Graham Bradshaw notes that ‘apprehending involves a 
predominantly sensory or sympathetic perception, and emphasizes that kind of 
responsive quickness’.  Comprehension, on the other hand, is a way of knowing 
that is precisely not of the body, not of the senses, and not of the material world. John Dee 
describes it as follows in his ‘Mathematicall Praeface’ to Euclid’s Elements of Geometrie
(1570):
Things supernatural are immaterial, simple, indivisible, incorruptible, and 
unchangeable. Things natural are material, compounded, divisible, corruptible, 
and changeable. Things supernatural are of the mind onely comprehended; things 
natural of the sense exterior are able to be perceived.
Theseus’s problem with the lovers’ story is the same as his problem with Hermia’s 
preference for Lysander: both represent the fruits of purely sensory data, a form of 
knowing that cannot be distinguished from feeling. Later in the scene, he describes it in 
terms of the body overcoming the mind, apprehension overcoming comprehension:
Such tricks hath strong imagination
That if it would but apprehend some joy
It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
Or in the night, imagining some fear,
How easy is a bush supposed a bear!
(5.1.18–22)
Like Olivia in Twelfth Night who ‘fear[s] to find / Mine eye too great a flatterer for my 
mind’ (1.5.298–9), Theseus is concerned with bodily responses somehow overcoming 
rational discernment. He complains in particular about the way a general sensory form of 
knowledge (I feel joy) can lead erroneously to a particular rational form of knowledge 
(such-and-such is the ‘bringer of that joy’). This is a case of sensation influencing and 
corrupting reason rather than quashing it altogether, something Theseus finds especially 
insidious.
This sceptical view of the senses found its most extreme expression in Shakespeare’s time 
in printed attacks on the theatre itself. The authors of these anti-theatrical tracts viewed 
plays as pathways to sin precisely because they appealed to sensory perception. In Phillip 
Stubbes’s colourful words in The Anatomie of Abuses (1583), plays are ‘sucked out of the 
Devil’s teats to nourish us in idolatry’. Further on he writes, ‘The shameless gestures of 
2
(p. 238) 3
4
Shakespearean Comedy and the Senses
Page 4 of 16
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 12 October 2018
Plaiers, serve to nothing so much, as to move the flesh to lust, and uncleanness’.  This 
tract makes a direct link between the bodies of the players on stage (‘gestures’) and the 
bodies, or ‘flesh’, of the spectators in the theatre. The image is of an affective continuum 
in which playgoers are physically embedded in the fiction on stage. Joseph P. Roach 
describes the dynamic like this. A player, he writes,
was able to act on the bodies of spectators who shared that space with him. … His 
motions could transform the air through which he moved, animating it in waves of 
force rippling outward from a center in his soul. His passions, irradiating the 
bodies of theirs, could literally transfer the contents of his heart to theirs, altering 
their moral natures.
Of course, this phenomenon does not need to be viewed in negative terms. There was a 
well-established Aristotelian tradition of defending theatre precisely because of its ability 
to elicit in spectators a visceral emotional response. In An Apology for Actors (1612), for 
example, Thomas Heywood makes this point in reference to stage comedy in particular:
If a Comedy, it is pleasantly contrived with merry accidents, and intermixt with apt 
and witty jests, to present before the Prince at certain times of solemnity, or else 
merily fitted to the stage. And what is then the subject of this harmelesse mirth? 
either in the shape of a Clowne, to shew others their slovenly and unhansome 
behaviour, that they may reforme that simplicity in themselves, which others make 
their sport, lest they happen to become the like subject of generall scorne to an 
auditory, else it intreates of love, deriding foolish inamorates, who spend their 
ages, their spirits, nay themselves, in the servile and ridiculous imployments of 
their Mistresses: and these are mingled with sportfull accidents, to recreate such 
as of themselves are wholly devoted to Melancholly, which corrupts the bloud: or 
to refresh such weary spirits as are tired with labour, or study, to moderate the 
cares and heavinesse of the minde, that they may returne to their trades and 
faculties with more zeale and earnestnesse, after some small soft and pleasant 
retirement.
If, as Heywood explains in the first part of this quotation, comedy can instruct and 
improve moral character simply by displaying the consequences of bad behaviour, it can 
also affect the bodies of spectators, curing ‘Melancholly, which corrupts the bloud’ and 
reinvigorating those who are ‘tired with labour, or study’. Heywood bases his defense of 
theatre precisely on its physical and sensory attributes. For Stubbes and other anti-
theatricalists, however, this was what made theatre a threat to moral and spiritual order. 
Plays were debased because they spoke a carnal language and fostered a corresponding 
carnality among spectators: ‘such laughing and fleering: such kissing and bussing: such 
clipping and culling: Suche winckinge and glancing of wanton eyes’, Stubbes writes 
derisively.
5
(p. 239) 
6
7
8
Shakespearean Comedy and the Senses
Page 5 of 16
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 12 October 2018
For a number of antitheatricalists, this sensuousness was not just ungodly; it was also 
inhuman. William Prynne in his colossal attack on the theatre, Histrio-mastix (1633), 
uses terms like ‘swarme’ and ‘infectious leprosie’ to describe the ‘carnall 
persons’ that constitute theatre audiences:
Players and Stageplaies, with which I am now to combate in a publike Theatre in 
the view of sundry partiall Spectators, are growne of late so prevalent in the 
affections, the opinions of many both in Citie, Court and Country; so universally 
diffused like an infectious leprosie, so deeply riveted into the seduced, 
prepossessed hearts and judgments of voluptuous carnall persons, who swarme so 
thicke in every Play-house, that they leave no empty place, and almost crowd one 
another to death for multitude.
In a similar if less grotesque vein, Stephen Gosson in Playes Confuted in Five Actions
(1582) writes that ‘Tragedies and Comedies stirre up affections, and affections are 
naturally planted in that part of the minde that is common to us with brute beasts’.
Gosson is drawing on Aristotle who understood the soul, or mind, to be the domain not 
only of intellectual powers, but also of vegetative and sensitive powers, including all 
forms of internal and external sensation, appetite, and motion. The intellectual 
component of the soul was, accordingly to Aristotle, uniquely human, but the sensitive 
component was common to both humans and animals.  Gosson’s argument, in other 
words, is that going to the theatre causes the soul to devolve back into a pre-rational, 
animalistic state. He targets comedies in particular, which he argues have the ability to 
shut down the rational faculties that manage purely sensory responses. ‘Comedies so 
tickle our senses with a pleasanter vaine’, he explains, ‘that they make us lovers of 
laughter, and pleasure, without any meane … wee laugh so extremely, that striving to 
bridle our selves, wee cannot’.  He concludes,
Where such excesse of laughter bursteth out that we cannot holde it, there is no 
temperance, for the time; where no temperance is, there is no wisedome, nor no 
use of reason; when we shew our soules voide both of reason, and wisedom, what 
are we then to be thought but fooles.
Theseus’s low opinion of the senses lacks the polemical bite of the antitheatrical tracts, 
but his words in Dream are a product of the same set of anxieties about the relationship 
between sensing and knowing. One important source for these anxieties was Protestant 
religious culture, which while by no means uniform in its view of the body still defined 
itself quite pointedly against the material and sensory investments of unreformed 
Christianity.  In Nosce Teipsum (1599), for example, Sir John Davies appeals to 
the story of Adam and Eve in order to illustrate the problem of sensory knowledge: 
‘Where they sought knowledge, they did error find, / Ill they desir’d to know, and Ill they 
did; / And to give Passion eyes, made Reason blind’. He continues,
How can we hope, that through the Eye and Eare,
This dying Sparkle, in this cloudie place,
(p. 240) 
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Can recollect those beames of knowledge cleare,
Which were enfus’d in the first minds by grace?
In Davies’s poem, the physical eye and ear of the body obscure the metaphysical eye and 
ear of the soul. Likewise, Richard Brathwaite, in Essaies upon the Five Senses (1620), 
asks his readers to ‘fixe here thine eye of inward contemplation’, and continues, ‘Though 
the eye of my bodie allude to the eye of my soule, yet is the eye of my soule darkened by 
the eye of my bodie’.
The kind of devaluation of the senses that we find in Davies, Brathwaite, and the anti-
theatrical tracts is part of a much longer intellectual genealogy. Indeed, one could trace it 
all the way back to Plato and see it culminating in the scientific revolutions of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Plato’s writings effect a gradual displacement of 
the concept of phronesis, a practical form of wisdom that assumes action to play an 
essential role in the acquisition of knowledge, with the concept of sophia, an abstract and 
ideal form of wisdom set in opposition to praxis and the operations of the body.  Plotinus, 
too, would come to view all kinds of bodily activity as merely debased forms of 
contemplation,  a hierarchical separation that continued in Roman thought and 
eventually reached its apex with René Descartes, whose famous commentary on gazing 
down from a window onto a busy street in Meditations on First Philosophy carefully 
undermines the idea of physical seeing as a form of knowing. Descartes writes, ‘When 
looking from a window and saying I see men who pass on the street, I really do not see 
them, but infer that what I see is men.’ ‘What’, he asks, ‘do I see from the window but 
hats and coats which may cover automatic machines?’  This kind of scepticism 
would propel Europe into the age of modern science, where the gaze of Man is always 
insufficient, and physical seeing never provides a reliable path to knowledge. Truth 
unfolds instead through a new kind of vision, once the onto-theological vision of 
philosophy, now the theoretical-instrumental gaze of modern science.
Theseus displays just this sort of scepticism. But he is not the only one. Shakespeare’s 
comedies are full of characters expressing views broadly consistent with the Platonic-
Cartesian tradition. Consider Errors, a play in which a citywide crisis of misrecognition 
shakes the very foundations of knowledge. Antipholus of Syracuse’s basic sensory 
question—‘what error drives our eyes and ears amiss?’ (2.2.187)—finds a parallel in 
Dromio of Syracuse’s basic epistemological question: ‘Do you know me, sir? Am I Dromio? 
Am I your man? Am I myself?’ (3.2.73–4). These fundamental uncertainties about 
sensation and knowledge haunt later comedies, too. Whether it’s Titania’s infatuation 
with Bottom in Dream, Olivia’s with Cesario/Viola in Twelfth Night, or Phoebe’s with 
Ganymede/Rosalind in As You Like It, Shakespeare consistently shows us how prone to 
error eyes and ears can be. Truth tends to lie beyond the reach of what can be seen, 
heard, or felt, and it is from this tendency that the comedies derive so much of their 
hilarity. At the same time, Shakespeare deploys this recurring device at different levels of 
complexity. For instance, while saying that Antipholus of Syracuse is Antipholus of 
Ephesus is simply false, saying that Cesario/Viola is attractive to Olivia is not. Plays like 
Twelfth Night and As You Like It remain engaging for modern audiences precisely 
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because there is a kind of truth in the hetero/homoerotic attraction that exists between 
pairs like Cesario/Viola and Olivia and Ganymede/Rosalind and Phoebe. Shakespeare’s 
cross-dressing plays show us how desire can challenge conventional ways of 
understanding the relationship between what we know and what we feel, even as they 
continue to rely on a basic linkage between sensation and deception.
The Promise of Sensation
For all their scepticism about the senses, the comedies also contain ideas that run 
counter to the arguments made in the tracts and treatises discussed above. If we turn 
once again to Dream, for example, we find that Hermia remains committed to the notion 
that her senses, rather than reason or intellect, offer the best means to navigate the 
world. Here she credits her ear with finding Lysander in the forest:
Dark night, that from the eye his function takes,
The ear more quick of apprehension makes.
Wherein it doth impair the seeing sense,
It pays the hearing double recompense.
Thou art not by mine eye, Lysander, found;
Mine ear, I thank it, brought me to thy sound.
(3.2.178–83)
Even when one sense (vision) is compromised, another (hearing) compensates. A different 
kind of optimism can be found in act 1 of Twelfth Night when Viola addresses the Captain:
There is a fair behaviour in thee, captain,
And though that nature with a beauteous wall
Doth oft close in pollution, yet of thee
I will believe thou hast a mind that suits
With this thy fair and outward character.
(1.2.43–7)
In lines that contrast starkly with Theseus’s meditation on apprehension and fantasy, 
Viola finds that seeing is essentially the same as knowing. She rejects the conventional 
wisdom that surface is distinct from depth, instead describing the Captain as an emblem 
of the harmony that can exist between ‘outward character’ and ‘mind’.
What these passages have in common is the way they express in vernacular dramatic 
terms a materialist and monistic worldview. Hermia makes no distinction between feeling 
and knowing, the body and the mind, just as Viola makes no distinction between outsides 
and insides. People and things, bodies and emotions, may differ at the level of form, but 
they are the same at the level of substance. This way of thinking about selfhood would not 
have been foreign to early modern men and women. Sixteenth-century humoral theory, 
(p. 243) 
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for example, described both physical and mental experience as dictated by the balance of 
four substances, or ‘humours’, common to all people. These are black bile, linked to the 
qualities of dry and cold and prominent in those with a melancholic temperament; 
phlegm, linked to the qualities of wet and cold and prominent in those with a phlegmatic 
temperament; blood, linked to the qualities of hot and wet and prominent in those with a 
sanguine temperament; and yellow bile, linked to the qualities of dry and hot and 
prominent in those with a choleric temperament. Keeping the humours in balance 
depended on how one managed six external factors known as the ‘non-naturals’: air, food 
and drink, exertion and rest, sleeping and waking, retentions and evacuations, and 
emotions (or ‘passions’).  Systematized by the Roman physician Galen, humoral theory 
subsequently became deeply entrenched in early modern culture. One study estimates 
that between 1500 and 1700 there were approximately 590 different editions of the 
works of Galen published.  In contrast to Platonic and Cartesian dualism, 
humoral theory is remarkable for the way it relates the body to the mind, and both to the 
environment. The inner world of emotions and thought, what we would call psychological 
states, are understood in material terms, as substances or fluids, in humoral theory.  The 
dependence of those humours on external elements like food and drink, and activities like 
eating, excreting, and sweating, which cross the boundary between inner and outer, knit 
the self into a physical scene that extends beyond the threshold of the body and certainly 
beyond the threshold of the mind.
The core assumption of humoral theory is that truth and knowledge are available to us 
only through the senses. In this respect it iterates in historically specific terms a broadly 
phenomenological way of understanding experience. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, one of the 
great twentieth-century phenomenologists, wrote, ‘all knowledge takes place within the 
horizons opened up by perception’. Similar arguments were made by other philosophers 
working in the same tradition.  Edmund Husserl, for example, maintained that every act 
of consciousness, every thought, is directed towards an object of some sort. That is to say, 
consciousness is always consciousness of something: the thought and the thing are never 
readily separable.  In Martin Heidegger’s version of phenomenology, this approach to 
thinking meant that consciousness must be understood as being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-
sein), in a world ‘out there’ rather than ‘in here’.  What set Merleau-Ponty apart was the 
force and precision with which he expressed these ideas, as when he declared, ‘there is 
no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself’.
Merleau-Ponty’s focus is on the way our senses gather information from a reality that is 
‘always “already there” before reflection begins’.  Rather than seeing the world and our 
actions in it as the products of ideas innate within the mind, Merleau-Ponty 
argued that we can only conceive what we first perceive, that thought is largely the 
product of embodied experience of the world.
These are seminal arguments within the history of twentieth-century philosophy, but they 
also gesture back to similarly sense-oriented theories of human cognition within the 
Aristotelian tradition of philosophy, including Scholasticism and neo-Scholasticism. As I 
mentioned above, Aristotle thought the mind possessed vegetative and sensory powers in 
addition to intellectual ones. Thomas Aquinas, following his lead, argued that all 
20
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knowledge and thought starts with the reception in the external sense organs of what he 
terms ‘sensible species’ transmitted from the sensible qualities in external objects.  This 
Thomistic model of cognition—precisely the model that Descartes’s dualistic philosophy 
sought to do away with—was maintained by later Scholastics during the Renaissance, 
especially in Spain and Italy.  Indeed, there is something curiously premodern about 
Merleau-Ponty’s sensual account of thought and about the conceptual machinery of 
phenomenology more generally. He suggests as much himself when he describes the goal 
of phenomenology as ‘re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world’.
I point out this link between the modern and the pre-modern in order to emphasize that 
phenomenology is not a historically fixed set of doctrines. More accurately, it is a practice 
or a method—a way of describing knowledge as embedded, sensory experience.  Defined 
thus, Shakespeare is a phenomenologist no less than Merleau-Ponty or Galen. The 
difference, of course, being that his phenomenological practice is poetic and theatrical 
rather than philosophical or medical. Hermia’s confidence in the ability of ‘the ear’ to 
compensate for ‘the eye’ and Viola’s contention that ‘a mind’ can correlate to ‘outward 
character’ contribute to something we might think of as a poetics of phenomenology. 
Other examples occur during the dénouements of the comedies when resolution is 
achieved through a series of visual and aural disclosures. A typical instance can be found 
at the conclusion of As You Like It when Rosalind’s true identity is discovered:
DUKE SENIOR. If there be truth in sight, you are my daughter.
ORLANDO. If there be truth in sight, you are my Rosalind.
PHOEBE. If sight and shape be true, Why then, my love adieu!
(5.4.116–19)
Sight and shape are certainly true in this scene, and although it is not good news 
for Phoebe, the revelation that Ganymede is Rosalind restores a daughter to Duke Senior 
and a lover to Orlando. Vision, in other words, in addition to being a source of knowledge, 
also re-establishes communal bonds. This idea is advanced earlier in the fifth act, as well, 
when Rosalind, addressing Orlando, describes the love that developed between Celia and 
Oliver:
for your brother and my sister no sooner met but they looked; no sooner looked 
but they loved; no sooner loved but they sighed; no sooner sighed but they asked 
one another the reason; no sooner knew the reason but they sought the remedy; 
and in these degrees have they made a pair of stairs to marriage.
(5.2.31–6)
Instead of being associated with confusion or error, seeing in these scenes provides a 
pathway to concord. It constitutes an act of social creation that transforms desire into 
marriage and strangers into family.
30
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This community-making aspect of sensation operates at a broader theatrical level, as 
well. Shakespeare’s comedies often trace a progression from one version of sense 
experience to another—from confusion to consensus and from error to truth. In this 
respect, comic form is an expression of the early modern period’s contradictory appraisal 
of the senses. In concrete theatrical terms, it entails an uneven evolution in the way 
sensory knowledge is distributed among stage characters and spectators. To give one 
simple example, what makes a play like Errors funny is the disconnect between what 
spectators see (Antipholus of Syracuse) and what characters on stage see (Antipholus of 
Ephesus). The relationship between sense perception and knowledge is different for each 
of the two groups that together constitute theatrical experience. The same can be said for 
act 3 scene 2 of Dream, in which Robin Goodfellow hides while imitating the voices of 
Lysander and Demetrius. Again, comedy is generated by a simple sensory disconnect: the 
playgoers can hear and see everything; Demetrius and Lysander can hear but not see. In 
many comedies, this disconnect is remedied in the final scenes. The end of Errors, for 
example, feels like a resolution because characters and spectators at last see and hear 
the same thing (this is Antipholus of Syracuse, that is Antipholus of Ephesus). The same 
could be said for the end of Twelfth Night when Duke Orsino slowly comes to terms with 
the truth about ‘Cesario’ or the final act of All’s Well that Ends Well where vision and 
hearing are once again revelatory. Shakespearean comedy depends for its effects on this 
carefully managed economy of sensation and knowledge.
The Ethics of Sensation
In the final section of this essay, I want to suggest that the collective sensory events I 
have just described have an effect that runs deeper, theatrically and philosophically, than 
the narrative resolution they seem to provide. The ability of Shakespeare’s 
comedies to establish a ‘commons of sensation’ is in fact central to what they achieve 
ethically. It is during these moments that actors and spectators move from a world in 
which the grammar of thought and action is ‘I’ and ‘me’ to one in which it is ‘we’ and ‘us’. 
It is here that Shakespeare thinks hardest about the possibility of community and about 
the way the senses—not just the rational protocols of politics and law—establish the 
conditions of this possibility.
To draw this final point out, I turn to Merchant, one of Shakespeare’s most experimental 
comedies in terms of tone and form. Shylock’s famous ‘hath not a Jew eyes’ speech is a 
peculiar example of the theatrical phenomenon I have been describing since it occurs not 
at the end of the play, but in the middle. Also, rather than marking a moment of joyous 
disbelief and revelation, Shylock’s speech responds to a difficult and complex moment of 
loss in which his daughter, his ducats, and one of his only sentimental possessions has 
slipped from his grasp. In addition, Shylock has learned that Antonio has defaulted on the 
(p. 247) 
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loan he made him. The speech is, in the first place, a justification of his intention to exact 
the collateral, a pound of Antonio’s flesh:
Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, 
affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject 
to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same 
winter and summer as a Christian is? If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle 
us do we not laugh? If you poison us do we not die? And if you wrong us shall we 
not revenge?
(3.1.54–62)
What makes Shylock’s speech so arresting is the way it achieves depth through surface. 
On one hand, the speech is an affirmation of legal personhood issued through an appeal 
to basic equality and reciprocal rights. On the other, it is an act of moral agency that 
manifests Shylock as a self worthy of empathy. Importantly, though, Shylock’s selfhood is 
rooted exclusively in outer life: hands, food, germs, temperature, tickling, and, of course, 
the senses. It is not something unique about Shylock’s mental or spiritual core that 
endows him with the complexity and emotional range required for selfhood. Rather, it is 
his invocation of a common stratum of creaturely life in which he partakes: his physical 
and formal presence, his vegetative need for sustenance, and his sensory responses to 
outer stimuli.
For playgoers—both in Shakespeare’s time and our own—Shylock creates a theatre of 
recognition grounded in the physical: acknowledge my eyes, my hands, my form, all the 
indicators of my creatureliness. It is a singular moment of self-manifestation, and we 
know, unmistakably, that we are supposed to care. Why is this exactly? Why do we feel 
that a recognition of Shylock on the sensory terms he has established matter? The reason, 
I think, is quite simple, and it forms the core of Shakespeare’s ethics in the comedies 
more generally: because acts of collective recognition are socially affirming; they ground 
us in an environment of shared experience and common imagination and establish, 
therefore, the only possible conditions for responsible world-making. In this sense, 
Shylock has something in common with the twentieth-century philosopher, 
Emmanuel Levinas. Both understand human being in non-ontological terms, as something 
manifest and given within a social collective, rather than something bounded and inward 
looking. In his two most influential books, Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise Than 
Being (1974), Levinas develops this idea into a radical ethics of selfhood, one founded on 
the idea that subjectivity is relational; a property not of hermetic cognitive experience but 
of the self’s encounter with, extension towards, and welcoming of the other.  While the 
mainstream of metaphysics explores being from the perspective of the singular, self-
identical ego—‘I think therefore I am’—Levinas, by contrast, proposes a mode of inquiry 
that prioritizes interpersonal experience. Levinas was convinced that the horrors of the 
Second World War were a result of systematized egotism: a culture-wide prioritization of 
(p. 248) 
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the inner life of the one over the outer lives of the many, a failure of recognition and 
acknowledgement of precisely the sort demanded by Shylock in his speech.
Of course, Shylock’s appeal to outer life—framed as it is by a claim to Antonio’s flesh and 
a steadfast commitment to revenge—is morally more complex than Levinas’s. From one 
perspective, this is as it should be: Shakespeare is a playwright, not a philosopher; he is 
not setting out to make a programmatic argument. At the same time, there is something 
thematically coherent about Shylock’s speech. His invocation of acts of revenge and 
punishment as part of the fabric of the commons, alongside shared social practices and 
shared physical presence, is of a piece with the larger imaginative world of the play in 
which lines of difference intertwine with lines of connectivity, in which people lend as 
enemies, spit and kick as goods change hands, and break bills but not bread—a world 
whose heterogeneity is the ground for both its conflict and its consensus.
It is also fitting that sensory experience is deployed in Shylock’s speech in a way that 
seems at once morally serious and deeply cynical. This kind of double vision is consistent 
with Shakespeare’s treatment of the senses across the comedies, which, as we have seen, 
display both suspicion about sensation’s relationship to knowledge and optimism about 
its ability to deliver truth. In this respect, the comedies participate in two disparate 
genealogies of thought: a dualistic tradition that starts with Plato, includes certain forms 
of Protestant polemic, and culminates in the scientific scepticism of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and a nondualistic, phenomenological tradition that stretches from 
theorists of the humours to twentieth-century thinkers like Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. 
The senses, therefore, offer a unique and especially rich site of meaning in Shakespeare’s 
comedies. Central to both the thematic and formal structure of the plays, sensation 
connects the comedies to the culture of their time while also facilitating serious 
philosophical speculation in our own.
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